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Abstract 
This article presents the concept of "objective travel time" as a key variable in 
railway line modernization decision making. The concept tries to achieve a threefold 
goal: optimization of economic resources, significant presence of the railway in the 
market share of the corridor, and a positive operational balance. The concept has been 
successfully applied in the new Rail Investment Program in Spain. 
Introduction 
The desire to improve the quality of intercity railway passenger services 
by reducing journey times has always existed. In the 1950s, this desire became 
an indispensable necessity in Europe for two reasons: ( 1) the rapid development 
of new road infrastructures ( e.g., dual carriageways and motorways) and (2) the 
increasingly widespread use of the airplane for middle- and long-distance jour-
neys within Europe. This increase in the use of air transport services was due to 
the introduction of the reactor, which provided greater speed, safety, and com-
fort. 
In an initial phase ( 1960-197 5), some European countries, especially 
France and the United Kingdom, carried out important modernizations on their 
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principal lines to achieve higher running speeds and, as a result, shorter journey 
times. 
After having exhausted the possibilities of modernizing the routes con-
structed in the 19th century, each country took a different approach: 
• France opted for the construction of new railway infrastructures, suitable 
for running speeds of 300 km/h. 
• The United Kingdom chose to put its faith in the technology of the vehi-
cles whose bodies tilt when negotiating curves. 
The technical, commercial, and economic success achieved by the French 
railways with the operation of the new high-speed line between Paris and Lyon 
immediately gave rise to the construction of new high-speed lines in France: 
TGV-Atlantic and TGV North. Soon after in 1991, the French government 
approved the Guidelines for New Railway Lines, which basically involved con-
structing a new, 4,700, km-long high-speed line. 
Meanwhile, British Rail was unable to perfect its tilting-body train, called 
APT, and eventually abandoned this approach in 1986. Interestingly, two years 
later, in 1988, the Italian railway company put a tilting-body train (the ETR 
450) into commercial service. In 1980, Spain's Talgo Pendular train had entered 
into commercial service. 
In short, the major European railway companies adopted two different 
approaches: on the one hand, the construction of new lines that allow trains to 
run at high speeds and, on the other, the use of trains with tilting bodies. 
The construction of new railway infrastructures requires significant finan-
cial resources, which are increasingly substantial due to the need to take greater 
precautions for protecting the environment. For example, the cost per km of the 
first high-speed line in France (between Paris and Lyon) was a third of the cost 
per km of the new line between Valence and Marseilles, which entered into 
commercial service in June 2001. 
In Europe, this situation has recently given rise to an extensive debate 
about the relative merits of investing in the use of rolling stock with tilting bod-
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ies as opposed to the construction of new lines, given the lower financial cost 
that this represents. 
In this context, this article offers an in-depth analysis of this problem and, 
at the same time, explains the methodology proposed to decide which invest-
ment is most advisable for any given service. This methodology was used by 
the Spanish government during 1999. 
The Need for New Railway Infrastructures in Europe: An 
Objective Fact? 
The first efforts to improve the quality of intercity railway passenger ser-
vices in Europe focused on the maximum exploitation of the possibilities 
offered by the existing routes. However, we should not forget that the Japanese 
national railway company's decision at the end of the 1950s to construct a new 
line for the development of high speed between Tokyo and Osaka marked the 
beginning of a duality that still exists today: constructing new infrastructures 
or modernizing those already in existence. 
It is useful to recall what Louis Armand, the former president of the 
International Union of Railways (UIC), stated in 1967: 
The future of railway passenger transport cannot be imagined without the 
development of high speed. The main approaches to be taken in this field can 
be divided into two categories: the modernization of what already exists, 
should we wish to surpass a certain level of speed (approximately 160 km/h), 
or the construction of new lines, as the Japanese have already done with the 
new Tokaido. The problem is, therefore, deciding whether we want to invest in 
order to perfect or in order to create. 
The process undergone in certain European countries from the 1960s to 
the present day can teach us a number of lessons that relativize theoretical dog-
mas and provide interesting approaches for guiding the investment decision 
required of each railway line. 
In this context, the construction of the first high-speed infrastructure in 
France was, in our opinion, essentially based on three facts: 
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I) The worrying evolution of the French railway company's share of the 
market on the Paris-Lyon route, as shown in Tablel. Despite the fact that 
the railway offered a journey time of four hours ( commercial speed of 
128 km/h), as opposed to three hours by airplane and five hours by pri-
vate vehicle (from the center of Paris to the center of Lyon), the railway 
lost 17 percent of the share of the market in four years ( 1963 to 1967), a 
loss which, in accordance with the forecasts, was to have increased by a 
further 23 percent only nine years later. 
2) Problems relating to a lack of capacity that the Paris-Lyon line suffered 
in the early 1970s, with over 260 journeys on certain days. 
3) Verification from 1972 onwards of the continuing fall in the number of 
first-class passengers using intercity services from Paris (Figure 1 ). At 
that time, Paris was linked to 143 French towns and cities at more than 
100 km/h in terms of commercial speed, with 67 towns and cities at 120 
km/h, and with 6 cities at more than 140 km/h. 
Table 1 
Modal Distribution of Passenger Traffic on the Paris-Lyon Route 
(1963-1976) 
Forecast for 
Mode of Transport 1963 1967 1976 
Railway 65% 48% 25% 
Airplane 7% 20% 39% 
Road 28% 32% 36% 
Source: Walrave ( 1970). 
With respect to the approach taken by the United Kingdom to improve the 
quality of its railway passenger transportation services, the decision was, in our 
opinion, basically due to these facts: 
1) The satisfactory position of British Rail in terms of market share on the 
routes situated within a radius of approximately 400 km from London 
(Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Modal Distribution of Passenger Traffic on Certain Routes 
(1980) 
Modal Distribution (%) 
From London to Road Airplane Railway 
Manchester (300 km) 42 27 31 
Newcastle (430 km) 20 35 45 
Leeds (288 km) 48 9 43 
Source: Button (1993). 
2) The introduction of commercial services with tilting-body vehicles 
which, due to the nature of certain sections of the routes, could reach 
speeds of 250 km/h would significantly reduce the journey times (Table 
3). Consequently, it was estimated that between London and the three 
cities mentioned in Table 3, the railway would have a market share of 80 
percent, as opposed to the 20 percent corresponding to the airplane. 
3) The construction of a new high-speed line heading north out of London 
would only significantly benefit the most distant population centers: 
Glasgow and Edinburgh (650 km). With the tilting-body vehicles it 
would be feasible to link both cities in four hours, giving the railway an 
estimated market share of between 50 and 60 percent with respect to the 
airplane. 
Subsequently, we must ask whether the respective approaches of each 
country were right. 
Table 3 
Foreseeable Effect of Tilting Trains on Journey Times on Certain 
Routes 
Journey Time 
From London to In 1980 With Tilting Trains 
Manchester 2h 25 2h 
Newcastle 3h 2h 20 
Leeds 2h 07 lh 45 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 1. The evolution of long-distance passenger traffic in SNCF 
1962-1982 
As for the French, the existing experience with the evolution of railway 
passenger traffic on intercity routes not served by high-speed lines confirms 
that the right decision was made (Table 4). 
In fact, on routes offering high-speed services, traffic increased by 45 per-
cent between 1990 and 1995, whereas on the routes without this type of ser-
vice, traffic fell by 18 percent. These trends are still evident today. 
In regards to the English decision, it was impossible to perfect the tilting-
body vehicle, leading to the project being abandoned in 1986 (Figure 2). 
The commercial use of vehicles with tilting bodies, as proposed by British 
Rail, required a 20- to 30-year research period. This technology was not actu-
ally available when the construction of the high-speed line between Paris and 
Lyon began (Figure 2). 
At the moment, tilting-body technology has reached a satisfactory level of 
development. This type of rolling stock will enter into service on the 
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Table4 
Evolution of Long-Distance Passenger Traffic on French Railways 
(1990-1995) 
Rate of Evolution of Tra{fi.c on 
Year Lines with TGV Services Lines without High-
Speed Services 
1990 100 100 
Source: Authors. 
London-Glasgow and London-Edinburgh lines in 2003/2004, once the respec-
tive layouts have been suitably modernized. 
Whatever the case, we do not believe that false comparisons should be 
made between new infrastructures and tilting-body vehicles. Both possibilities 
are useful instruments at the railway's disposal for providing the most suitable 
commercial, technical, and financial response to the needs of the demand on 
any given route. 
Table 5 shows how an approach based on modernization of lines, pendu-
lation, tilting, or construction of new infrastructures has enabled the railway to 
secure very significant market shares. This reality confirms the value of each 
of these actions. 
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Figure 2. Historical development of tilting-body systems 
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Table 5 
The Technology Used and Railway Market Share 
Market Share 
Journey Rail Rail 
Country Service Line 1ime All Modes Air 
Germany Hamburg-F rankfun New + Modernized 3h40 39% 44% 
F rankfun-Munich 
New + Modernized 3h30 37% 53% 
Sweden Stockholm-Gothenbourg New+ Modernized + 2h 59 
-
55% 
Rocking 
Spain Madrid-Seville New 2h 15 48% 82% 
Madrid-Malaga New + Swinging 4h 
----
30% 
France 
Paris-Lyon 
Paris-C. Ferrand New 2h 40% 90% 
Paris-Strasbourg Modernized 3h 19 35% 80% 
Paris-Montpellier Modernized 4h --- 44% 
New + Modernized 4h15 
---
49% 
Source: L6pez-Pita (1999). 
A New Methodology for Making Decisions 
Practical experience shows that journey time plays an essential role in the 
customer's choice of transport mode. The methodology proposed below is 
based on the idea of defining journey time ("objective"). 
Specifically, this methodology involves determining the quality of the ser-
vice (with respect to journey time), which, by optimizing financial resources, 
represents a significant presence of the railway in the transport system of any 
given corridor, and determines a positive operating balance for the operator of 
the line. That is, it is not a matter of traveling as fast as is technically possible, 
but as fast as commercially and financially necessary. Two examples are pre-
sented here to illustrate this point. 
Consider, by way of example, the possible influence of the reduction of 
the current journey time by rail (two hours) between Paris and Lyon. What 
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would be the foreseeable effect of an investment aimed at achieving a journey 
time of, say, lh 45m? 
The application of demand modeling techniques and the evaluation of 
income and operating costs associated with a certain kind of traffic allow us to 
obtain a response for that specific route. From the point of view of securing 
extra demand, all of which would come from air traffic, the railway's current 
90 percent share of the market would rise to 95 percent. With regard to this 
existing relationship with air traffic, the vast majority of new customers are 
captured from air traffic due to connections and reasons of proximity to their 
place of residence or work. 
From the point of view of operating costs, the market share would 
increase significantly. This would be due to the need to raise the maximum 
speed from 260/270 km/h to 300 km/h, with the consequent increase in energy 
consumption that this would entail. 
The overall economic balance is negative. It cannot be said that an investment 
decision, which, with respect to the route in question aimed to reduce the existing 
journey time by rail, would be commercially and financially justified ( and without 
taking into account the possible supplementary investments in the railway line and 
in the rolling stock). We call this phenomenon "the price of excess speed." 
The second example corresponds to the opposite situation: insufficient 
commercial performances. Consider the case of the Madrid-Barcelona route in 
Spain. At one stage the possibility of constructing two variants along the length 
of this route was considered a way of reducing the journey time by rail. The 
investment required for constructing these variants exceeded $1 billion and the 
journey time would fall from 6h 30m to approximately 5h 30m. 
Once again, the application of demand modeling techniques allows us to 
quantify this effect. The expected result for the capture of new demand was rel-
atively insignificant. 
This conclusion should be analyzed in light of the fact that there are 62 
flights a day in each direction between Madrid and Barcelona, with fares sim-
ilar to those of the railway at certain times of the day. 
The two preceding illustrative examples lead to the following reflections: 
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1) On occasion, reducing the journey time by rail below a certain level may 
imply an unsuitable and unnecessary investment (first example). 
2) On occasion, investing to reduce the journey time by rail, but keeping 
this time above a certain level, may imply an investment that is of little 
interest to the railway ( second example). 
Based on the above reflections, it is advisable for each railway route 
under consideration to establish the journey time ("objective"). This will 
depend on, among other variables, the transport market conditions corre-
sponding to the route in question. 
Figure 3 shows that for railway to achieve market shares, with respect to 
other transport modes, of around 48 percent, it is not necessary to achieve the 
same journey time over the same distance, or a similar commercial speed. For 
a lower market share level (,.., 40% ), a French example and a German example 
illustrate the same point. 
Rail market 
share(%) 
0 
Paris-C. Ferrand 
Hamburg-Frankfurt 
0 0 
Paris-Nantes I 
Paris-Brussels 
222 km/h 
195 km/h 
3h19 3h35 2h 
Travel time by rail 
1h25 
Source: L6pez-Pita (2000). 
Figure 3. "Objective travel time" In some European relationships 
Vol. 4, No. 1, 200 l 
Journal of Public Transportation 55 
Each route considered here is a singular case and requires specific analysis. 
In summary, the goal is to establish an investment policy that will make it 
possible to increase rail transport, and at the same time generate a growth in 
economic activity on the corridor concerned. 
Application to the Spanish Case 
The Spanish railway carries out its activity within the framework of a trans-
port system in which the two principal modes, air transport and road transport, have 
reached levels of quality and development that are unlikely to undergo major mod-
ifications. In this context, it is important to address the role of the Spanish railway 
in the 21st century within the sphere of intercity passenger services. 
For this purpose, a series of studies was carried out in relation to the main 
corridors, basically radial routes linking Madrid with the rest of Spain's 
provincial capitals. The objective was to specify the practical significance of 
the "attractive railway offer" concept. This concept encompassed three aspects: 
I) The need to optimize the financial resources allocated to railway invest-
ments, especially at a time when European governments are attempting 
to achieve a zero public deficit. 
2) The suitability of achieving a significant presence of the railway, in 
terms of market share, to reduce the excessive demand that burdens 
other modes of transport. 
3) The need to achieve a positive economic balance in the operation of the 
lines. 
From a practical point of view, the methodological process consisted of 
analyzing, for each route considered, the effect of reducing the existing jour-
ney time by rail. In general, two or three inferior times were considered and 
their effect was quantified in terms of: 
• investment required, 
• traffic the railway could capture, 
• the railway's share of the market, and 
• economic balance for the operator, including the possible need to acquire 
new rolling stock. 
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The use of certain complementary indicators, such as the investment relat-
ing to the increase in traffic or the additional investment for achieving a cer-
tain additional increase in traffic, made it possible to immediately choose the 
most advisable investment alternative and, therefore, the objective journey 
time associated with it. Figure 4 shows the results obtained. The construction 
projects necessary for implementing the scheduled investments are currently in 
the process of being drawn up. 
Conclusions 
This article has highlighted the fact that investment in the railway aimed 
at improving the quality of intercity passenger services cannot be based on 
apriorisms about the type of action: construction of new lines or utilization of 
tilting-body vehicles. 
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Figure 4. Investment program in railway infrastructures 2000-2007 
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With regard to each country and each route considered, it is necessary to 
carry out an analysis that detennines the most suitable course of action from 
the commercial and financial points of view. 
The Spanish railway has adopted a methodology based on finding the 
"objective time" of each route (i.e., the service quality that optimizes financial 
resources and perfonnances ). 
The evaluation of the "objective time" is the end result of a process that 
considers a series of journey times by rail that are inferior to the existing time, 
and selecting them by comparison with those offered by road or air transport. 
This methodology has been applied to the Spanish railway and has made 
it possible to avoid approaches based on radical, generally willful hypotheses, 
or approaches based on hypotheses that have an insufficient effect on the 
improvement of the rail service. 
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